Small firms that are managed or controlled by founding families, hereafter, referred to as family firms, constitute an important source of the economic system in Italy. We found family firms are more likely to outperform non-family firm. After controlling for firm specific variables, we find a positive association between family ownership and firm; while the management by family members seems not to impact on corporate performance. This research demonstrates the correlation between the family firms and the performance depends greatly on the type of family business, as well as the influence that the founding family exercises, through ownership and/or management.
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In-Text Citation: (Campanella et al., 2021)
To Cite this Article: Campanella, F., Serino, L., & Crisci, A. (2021). The Controversial Association between “The Family Effect” and Corporate Performance: Analysis of Longitudinal Data. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting Finance and Management Sciences, 11(2), 90–105.
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